

SUBJECT: M. I. 21 Analysis

Approved For Release 2003/10/29 : CIA-RDP83M00171R002100210003-9

LOG NO.: 10163

DATE OF ITEM: 5.5.80 DATE RECEIVED: 7-80

D/PAO COMMENTS:



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DISPOSITION:

FILE: NFEB

ACTION:

COORDINATE WITH:

SUSPENSE DATE: 15 May 80

EA/PAO COMMENTS: we feel we

NOT under
stood art
DESTROY

① Strange way of attaching
the problem.

② Do you want anyone to
prepare any comments on
this?

NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD

NFIB-82.1/3
5 May 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD

FROM : Walter Elder
Secretary

SUBJECT : Multiple Analysis Guidelines

1. The attached draft guidelines have been approved by the Director of Central Intelligence for circulation for your consideration. (U)

2. Please forward your comments or concurrence to the Secretary, NFIB, by close of business, 15 May. If we have not heard from you by that date, or if you have not requested more time for consideration, we shall take it that you concur in the draft guidelines. (U)

[Redacted Signature]

WALTER ELDER

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Attachment
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MULTIPLE ANALYSIS GUIDELINES

1. In discharging my responsibilities as the President's senior intelligence advisor I, as ^{have} previous Directors of Central Intelligence, encourage the development of diverse points of view on subjects of importance to the national security of the United States. I believe this serves to subject intelligence analysis and judgments to rigorous scrutiny. (U)

2. While it is vital to provide multiple analyses on significant national issues, I am also sensitive to the need to concentrate these efforts on only those activities or issues which require such treatment. I have, therefore, established the following guidance for multiple analyses of foreign weapons or space systems and related issues under the cognizance of the Weapon and Space Systems Intelligence Committee. (S)

3. Those topics for multiple analyses will meet at least one of the following criteria:

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- Foreign weapon or space systems which have an actual or potentially important impact on the viability of the US strategic deterrent or on the overall US/USSR strategic balance.
- Foreign systems which could affect the fundamental military balance in NATO/Europe or other geographic areas important to US national interests.
- Foreign systems which are covered by existing arms control agreements or by ongoing arms control negotiation or preparation for negotiation.
- Certain civil space systems which either have an important political or economic impact or may have important military implications. (S)

4. In order to provide further guidance on the types of systems covered by these definitions, I have divided foreign weapons and space classes of systems into three categories or tiers of importance. The top tier systems are those which unquestionably meet one or more of the above criteria and, therefore, need multiple analysis to provide policymakers with as complete a view as possible of their implications. New or unidentified activities will need multiple analysis, at least until the activity is fairly well understood. (S)

5. In the second tier are those systems which do not clearly meet the above criteria but may require multiple analysis on a system-by-system basis. Such analyses will

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only be undertaken after a thorough review considering all of the following factors:

- Current importance of the system based on its threat potential, its state of development, and data requirements for US countermeasures.
- Uncertainties or major disagreements regarding the weapon or space system characteristics, performance, and mission.
- Consistency with priorities assigned as defined in Basic US Foreign Intelligence Requirements Categories and Priorities (Attachment to DCID.1/2). (S)

6. Tier-three systems or issues are those for which no multiple analyses are required except under extraordinary circumstances. These systems are those for which one of the following conditions apply: (1) the country of origin is listed as category 4 or below in DCID 1/2; (2) the system is not a key element of overall military capability; or (3) the system has been so well defined that no further analysis is required. (S)

7. In those cases where multiple analyses are undertaken, the level of duplication must be carefully considered to avoid any unnecessary redundancy in the

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processing of basic intelligence data.^{1,2} This means that NFIB agencies will rely to the maximum extent possible on existing community processing for first-level reporting; e.g., NSA for SIGINT, NPIC for PHOTINT, the US Navy for ACINT, and CIA for HUMINT. This will not preclude any NFIB agency conducting multiple analyses from access to recorded technical data and duplication of some processing when the nature of the intelligence issue makes this a primary requirement. For example, when an agency believes that an intercepted signal is the key to an understanding of the capability of the system, independent processing by that agency will be permitted. (S)

8. These guidelines are not intended to supplant existing instructions regarding production of departmental intelligence. Neither are they intended to disrupt or circumvent the formal and informal channels of communication that now exist within the Intelligence Community for the exchange of analytical views. These interagency mechanisms include th

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¹ NSA does not agree with the inclusion of this paragraph. NSA believes that the Director of NSA must retain ultimate control of SIGINT materials and should therefore review, on a case-by-case basis, requests for raw data from the S&T community. (S)

² The Navy also has reservations on portions of this paragraph. (U)

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the Radar and Optical Working Group (ROWG), and the various subcommittees and working groups of WSSIC and the SIGINT Committee. (S)

Implementation

9. The Weapon and Space Systems Intelligence Committee (WSSIC) will have the responsibility for overseeing the provisions of these guidelines. Their specific responsibilities will include preparation of amplifying criteria for the classes of systems under the established tiers, their assignment to one of the three tiers, and advising member agencies as to whether specific weapons intelligence problems meet these criteria. (U)

10. WSSIC will periodically review all community analysis efforts on weapons and space analysis to identify examples of unnecessary duplication of effort. (U)

11. WSSIC will review these guidelines one year from its date of issuance and advise me on whether changes or modifications are warranted. (U)